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Abstract 
We analyze the diffusion and integration of external knowledge by distinguishing between 
the depth and breadth of technological knowledge in combination with the type of partner 
and channel of exchange. Using a latent variable structural equation model with a sample 
of 202 US biotechnology firms between 1990 and 2009, we investigate the extent to which 
the M&As with different partners contribute to the depth and breadth of the focal firm’s 
knowledge base. Our analysis also addresses potential endogeneity issues and shows that 
acquisitions of related firms mainly increase the depth of knowledge, while acquisitions of 
unrelated firms develop the breadth of knowledge. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a general consensus about the fact that innovation, one of the most relevant 
drivers of economic growth, is deeply affected by mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
strategies (e.g. Bena & Li 2013; Cassiman et al. 2005; Katz & Shelanski 2005; Phillips & 
Zhdanov 2013).  
However, despite the relevance of the impact of M&As on innovation input and 
output, both in the short and long term, few academic efforts have focused on this topic, 
and the findings of the studies are far from conclusive. For instance, M&As reduce the 
duplication of efforts and costs in research activities, thereby encouraging firms to reduce 
their investments in research and development (hereafter R&D) (Bloom et al. 2013; 
Hoberg & Phillips 2010; Reinganum 1983), but at the same time, the M&A process also 
influences its member firms to exploit economies of scale or scope in research enhancing 
R&D investment (Amore et al. 2013; Brown et al. 2012; Ferreira et al. 2012). Thus, the 
net effect on innovative input is puzzling. Furthermore, member parties frequently assert 
that M&As can improve their research performance because of new and better processes 
or products, which in turn enlarge their technological diversity and their innovative 
capabilities (Cassiman et al. 2005). Conversely, there is some evidence that shows that 
acquiring firms target those firms that are developing similar products with related 
technological skills (Bena & Li 2013), which can have a negative impact on the variety of 
new products, long-run innovative growth and market competition (Ornaghi 2009). 
Therefore, given the conflicting results in prior literature on innovation, we believe 
that the impact of M&As on innovation output deserves further attention. Our paper aims 
to contribute to this debate by focusing on the direct consequences of M&As on firms’ 
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technological activities to better understand the production of technological knowledge 
through M&As. More precisely, our main research question is: How does the corporate 
takeover affect the creation of the technological breadth and depth of knowledge - the 
horizontal and vertical knowledge dimensions - which can simplify our understanding of 
diffusion of the technological knowledge through M&As and their interdependence? 
Many recent studies on the technological innovation process emphasize the 
development of the technological breadth and depth of knowledge (e.g. Alexy et al. 2013; 
George et al. 2008; Hughes & Kitson 2012; Katila & Ahuja 2002) and find that an 
important strategy for successful innovation is to search for external ideas that have 
commercial value. Technological breadth refers to the variety of areas explored to develop 
a particular subject, while technological depth refers to the analytical sophistication or 
specialization of the complex subject associated with the difficulty conceptualizing 
expertise or competence (Wang & Von Tunzelmann 2000). In other words, breadth is the 
broader set of different components embodied in an innovation, and depth is the degree of 
specialization embodied in the knowledge components of that innovation. In industrial 
organization terms, both breadth and depth represent the vertical and horizontal features of 
the innovative process, where the former is related to the variety of the innovation and the 
latter is related to the quality of the innovation. Thus, it is also important to have a proper 
measure of the breadth and depth of the technological knowledge of firms, particularly in 
technology-intensive industries.  
Using a unique dataset from a sample of 202 biotechnology firms headquartered in the 
US, we show how acquiring firms through M&As develop the two distinct dimensions – 
depth and breadth – of technological knowledge by choosing their potential targets. We 
consider all the patents filed by these firms in the US patent office and other countries 
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between 1984 and 2009 as products of inventions. We measure the depth by the extent to 
which a patent draws upon a certain technology (identified by the International Patent 
Classifications or IPC codes) more intensively than others and the breadth1 by the range of 
new technologies (IPC codes) included in the patents. We aggregate the patent-year level 
data to the firm-year level for technological depth and breadth of these firms during the 
study period.  
This paper contributes to the innovation literature in several ways. First, there exists 
only a limited number of studies that focus on the direct consequences of M&As on firms’ 
technological activities (Cassiman et al. 2005; Valentini 2012). As previously mentioned, 
because of the conflicting results in the existing literature, it is difficult to understand the 
production of technological knowledge through M&As. Our paper provides additional 
insight into the role of M&As in the creation of knowledge, thus bridging the gap in the 
related literature (e.g. Alexy et al. 2013; Henderson & Clark 1990; Katz & Preez 2008; 
Laursen & Salter 2006) 
Second, and most importantly, the paper contributes methodologically by developing a 
unique measure of the technological breadth and depth of knowledge from the IPC codes. 
Based on the previous measure (Katila & Ahuja 2002; Moorthy & Polley 2010), which 
uses backward patent citations, our measure differs from this as we measure the breadth 
and depth directly from the IPC codes of patents to detect the technological breadth and 
depth of the firms. In addition, as we observe only innovation output of firms through new 
products and patents (not the innovation decision or process), using the latent variable 
structural equation model (LVSEM), we capture better results of knowledge production. 																																																								
1 We found only a few patents without IPC codes and excluded them from the data. Furthermore, their effect 
is negligible compared to the total patent numbers in my database. Sometimes the patent may not have main 
IPC codes as the invention cannot be fit into a specified IPC file, but the patent has a set of secondary IPC 
codes. 
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Our econometric model also addresses potential endogeneity issues in the strategic 
initiative decisions of the knowledge development process for the focal firms. 
Third, the present paper provides relevant implications for business strategies and 
economic policies, both in the short and long term. This paper suggests that firms must be 
selective in choosing their M&A partners and targets because their knowledge acquisition 
and integration have significant impact on the breadth and/or depth of the R&D activities 
as well as on the dynamics of the whole innovative process. 
 
2. Literature and research questions 
Traditionally, innovation has been conceptualized as a process of creation, accumulation 
and recombination of knowledge embodied in science and technology. To sustain this 
innovative process, it is compulsory for a firm to upgrade its knowledge stock (Castellacci 
& Zheng 2010; Dosi 1988; Herstad et al. 2013; von Tunzelmann et al. 2008). This 
knowledge stock can be improved either internally, such as by investing in R&D or by 
internal learning, or it can be externally acquired from sources outside the firm’s 
boundaries, such as by technological co-operation, research joint ventures, strategic 
alliances and M&A. The present paper focuses on the second possibility, i.e., the firm’s 
ability to reconfigure and integrate external complementary knowledge from an external 
source through M&As. Mergers occur when independent firms combine their resources 
and activities to form a new entity, and an acquisition occurs when one firm gains control 
of the majority of the ownership of the acquired firm. 
The relevant question is: How do firms assimilate and integrate technological 
knowledge after acquiring it? The studies of Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) contribute 
to the literature in this context. They argue that R&D activities broaden a firm’s absorptive 
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capacity ( the by-product of the R&D process), which is the assimilation of knowledge 
from external sources. A number of studies on innovation also show that investment in 
R&D increases a firm’s ability to exploit external technological knowledge (Arora & 
Gambardella 1994; Henderson & Cockburn 1994; Henderson & Clark 1990). This implies 
that these firms can assimilate knowledge when the external knowledge aligns with their 
technological knowledge portfolio and that these firms can transform the knowledge when 
the external knowledge does not fit with the existing knowledge stock (Todorova & 
Durisin 2007).  
A substantial body of literature recognizes the importance of external and 
complementary knowledge (Antonelli 2000; Bertrand & Zuniga 2006; Cohen & Levinthal 
1990; Laursen & Foss 2003; Lissoni 2001; Teece 1986) acquired through strategic 
partnerships, research joint ventures and M&As (Adams & Marcu 2004; de Faria et al. 
2010). These studies show that inter-firm knowledge spillovers help in the cross-
fertilization of new ideas and in the creation of new technology. The speed of 
technological change and the need for external technological knowledge that can 
complement internal R&D often motivate firms to extend their resources through M&As 
(Hagedoorn & Duysters 2002). In a study of 9000 deals between 1990 and 2000, 
Villalonga and McGahan (2005) find that the likelihood that a firm will choose acquisition 
over other forms of collaboration increases with the technological resources of the 
potential targets. The question then is as  follows: Is there a process in which M&As 
directly affect the innovation? Lerner et al. (2003) show that firms can acquire the 
portfolios of patents from their competitors through M&As. In addition, studies find that 
firms often acquire alliance partners (Porrini 2004; Zollo & Reuer 2010) of target firms. 
Hence, the strategic decision of a M&A to acquire new technological knowledge and 
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capabilities has become a well-institutionalized corporate phenomenon (Larsson et al. 
1998; Uhlenbruck et al. 2006).  
 
2.1. Mergers and acquisitions: breadth and depth of knowledge 
The consequences of M&As, as previously mentioned, could be two-fold. On the one 
hand, a firm can engage in more R&D by achieving scale and scope of economies than it 
could before the acquisition. On the other hand, because of the high R&D budget in the 
post-M&A period, fundamental research projects receive more attention, and 
consequently, firms can increase their technological capabilities. Furthermore, if some 
technological knowledge is tacit in nature and embedded in the organizational routines, 
M&A becomes the best strategic choice. Additionally, innovative firms are more likely to 
acquire firms with patents of high commercial importance over an extended period of time 
(Higgins & Rodriguez 2006), thus indicating a close link between technological 
knowledge development and M&A activities. Hence, acquiring technologically rich 
targets provides the acquirer an opportunity to be exposed to new and diverse knowledge 
(Hitt et al. 1996). The similarity between the technological knowledge of the acquirer and 
the target facilitates the exchange, combination and exploitation of what is already known 
(Nonaka et al. 1996). Conversely, acquiring complementary technological knowledge 
(which is dissimilar in nature) increases the integrating costs (Katila & Ahuja 2002) 
because of complexity and challenges (Grant 1996). In sum, knowledge development is 
largely affected by the similarity and complementarity of technological knowledge in 
M&As. Yet, the common knowledge stocks of both the acquirer and the acquired firm 
facilitates communication and integration between the two, thereby expanding the scope 
of exploitation when technological knowledge is similar enough for learning and 
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complementary enough to easily understand the uniqueness of the value. This suggests 
that innovation is based on intensive research and an existing knowledge dimension, as in 
the exploitative innovation case (Quintana-Garcia & Benavides-Velasco 2008). In other 
words, technology-based acquisitions stimulate both exploration and exploitation 
processes in developing the technological knowledge of the acquirer.  
 
2.1.1. Knowledge creation in technologically related M&As 
The above argument raises the following question: What factors determine the 
development of the knowledge portfolio of the acquirer? Studies regarding M&As 
emphasize that the success of the post-M&A technological output depends on the strategic 
fit of the partners. For instance, the technology relatedness of the partners helps to 
integrate efficiently the technological knowledge of the R&D divisions of both firms 
(Cassiman et al. 2005; Cloodt et al. 2006; Hagedoorn & Duysters 2002).2   
However, controlling additional technologies and the variety of technologies 
becomes more costly than accessing them. Loasby (1998) suggests that the firm can take 
advantage of only “crucial and manageable” technologies for the innovation. Thus, the 
stronger the firms are in their R&D efforts, the better they can access and exploit new 
complementary assets. In this way, the acquirer can only enrich its existing knowledge 
from the R&D of target firms in related technology, as the existing technological skills can 
leverage the absorptive capabilities with similar external knowledge. In addition, the 
technology relatedness in M&As reduces the R&D efforts, shortens the time horizon of 
projects and, more importantly, provides an opportunity to emphasize development over 
																																																								
2	As previously mentioned, it partly depends on the absorptive capacity of the acquirer (Cohen & Levinthal 
1990).	
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research (Cassiman et al. 2005). Moreover, experience in similar technology domains is 
likely to make the search process more predictable and more efficient (Lane & Lubatkin 
1998).  
This gives rise to the following question: How does the similarity in technology 
between the acquirer and the target firms affect the innovation activities of the firms in the 
post-merger period? Studies show that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between technology relatedness and post-merger innovation performance in the 
technology-intensive industry (Cloodt et al. 2006). Hence, within limits, the technology 
similarity within the firm’s technology knowledge domain leads to a local search and 
exploitation of existing knowledge (Stuart & Podolny 1996). This suggests that the 
technology-based acquisitions of firms in related industries positively affect the depth of 
technological knowledge. 
 
2.1.2. Knowledge creation in technologically unrelated M&As  
Because an invention is followed by innovation, extraordinary innovation does not occur 
within a single technological field, but rather within a combination of multiple 
technological fields (Colombelli et al. 2013; Schoenmakers & Duysters 2010). The studies 
indicate that the industrial structure has an immense influence on the diversification of 
production and innovation. Investigating the effects of the related technology of acquired 
firms on the innovation of acquiring firms or on their mutual innovation, several studies 
have divided the sample into technologically related acquisitions and technology unrelated 
acquisitions based on IPC codes and citations of patents (Cloodt et al. 2006; Hagedoorn & 
Duysters 2002). However, these studies have failed to document the significance of 
technology similarities and complementarities within the technologically related M&As. 
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Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) define complementarity in terms of fewer similarities 
between the functional areas of the acquiring and the acquired firms. Thus, new 
technological innovation may occur if there exists dynamics of proprietary or specialized 
knowledge and skill transfer such that the knowledge disseminates from one unit of one 
firm to another unit of another firm that is weak in those areas. Consequently, an unrelated 
or dissimilar takeover outperforms those deals triggered by industry-related bids because 
of cross-fertilization of multiple dissimilar technologies. 
While Makri et al. (2010) discuss the knowledge relatedness with respect to M&As, it 
is noted that by integrating complementary knowledge, acquiring firms can create 
additional and supper-additive3 value synergies that are not captured by technology 
relatedness. Thus, firms acquire complementary assets (e.g., regulatory knowledge, 
manufacturing and marketing capabilities) to increase innovation capabilities through 
bilateral dependence between R&D and downstream activities with market-oriented firms 
in vertical integration (Teece 1988, 1992). However, a horizontal acquisition with firms, 
such as competitors, in the same industry provides complementary technological 
knowledge that increases their R&D efforts (Capron 1999). Accordingly, the acquirer can 
spread its fixed costs over more R&D output and increase the scale of its R&D 
investments (Bertrand & Zuniga 2006). In addition, acquiring firms can obtain a broader 
pool of intellectual capital for more synergies in unrelated acquisitions (Park 2003). 
However, by acquiring the competitors necessary to gain market power, most M&As are 
not solely about knowledge acquisition nor are they solely about technology-based 
acquisition. Rather, they are about obtaining the required knowledge needed for 
innovation. Thus, it is obvious that the acquiring firms obtain more knowledge from the 																																																								
3 See Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1995) 
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targets than they actually need. Therefore, technology-based acquisitions of firms in less 
similar industries can positively affect the breadth of technological knowledge. 
 
3. Methodological approach 
 
3.1. Empirical model 
 
This section describes our data analysis approach using the latent variable structural 
equation model (LVSEM) approach where the structural model evaluates the path 
significance and the measurement model shows the validity and reliability of the selected 
factors. The endogeneity issue is overcome by generalized method of moment (GMM) in 
the robustness test.  
We build a theory to investigate the impact of M&As on the development of 
technological knowledge, which results in a model structure where the innovation (a latent 
variable) mediates between the firm’s involvement in M&A and the firm’s technological 
knowledge development. The acceptability of fit of the full model is evaluated by the 
LVSEM. We have also tested the partial model that reveals a direct relationship between 
acquisition and knowledge development as well as an indirect relationship through the 
innovation variable. 
 
3.1.1. Conceptual framework 
 
Suppose a biotech firm ‘k’ is involved in a technological knowledge creation decision in 
two alternative dimensions – building breath or depth in period t. 
Considering the situation where the technological knowledge creation through the 
innovation process is reflected by patenting activities and is important based on the extent 
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of its participation in the M&A process, we develop the following conceptual model with 
latent variable construct: 
 
 
 
 
where INV is the involvement of the firm in acquiring knowledge from the acquired firms 
in the M&A process. This consists of three variables, namely, a merger dummy (1 if the 
firm involves M&As in a particular year, 0 otherwise), the lag of the number of related (or 
unrelated) acquisitions and the lag of the number of times the firm is acquired. 
INN represents the innovation activities of the firm that depend on the lag of R&D 
intensity, the lag (2 years) of the number of alliances, firm size, firm age, and the lag of 
financial leverage.  
KNW is another latent variable that indicates the knowledge stock of the firm that is 
developed by the innovation process. This variable is comprised of our main variables of 
interest – the depth and breadth of technological knowledge.   
 
3.1.2. Structural equation model 
Expanding the structural form of the above relationship that describes the decision to 
create knowledge, we write the following model: 
 !"#!,! = !! + !!!"!,(!!!) + !!!"!,(!!!)! + !!!"!,(!!!)! + !!"#                       (1) 
 
where !"! is the vector to capture the effects of the M&A process, !"!! is the number of 
related (or unrelated) acquisitions, and !"!! is the number of times the firm is acquired by 
other firms. !! is the corresponding vector of parameters. !!"# is the error term with usual 
properties. The above equation holds because the firm’s response to the above 
Involvement in Corporate 
Takeover (INV) 
Innovation 
(INN) 
Quality of 
Knowledge 
(KNW) 
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independent variables does not influence it to be innovative, but rather, its level of 
innovativeness causes its response, i.e., to collaborate with other firms (see Figure 1 and 
2). 
It is noted that the focal biotech firm has an ongoing innovation process that develops and 
upgrades its knowledge stock. To capture this, we include the latent variable INN, which is 
governed by the following equation: 
 !""!,! = !! + !!!&!"#$!, !!! + !!!"#$!, !!! + !!!"#"$%&"!, !!! + !!!"#!,!+ !! !"#$!,! +  !!""                    (2)                    
 
 
The innovation of firm ‘k’ depends on the R&D intensity (R&Dint), the number of 
alliances (nrAL), financial leverage (Leverage), firm age (Age) and firm size (Size).  
As discussed in the theoretical framework, the firm builds its technological knowledge 
stock through the innovation process, which is mediated by the corporate takeover 
(M&As). The following equation attempts to capture this situation. 
 !"#!,! = !! + !!!"#$%&'!,! + !!!"#$%!,! + !!"#                   (3) 
 !"#$%&'!,! and !"#$%!,! are detailed in the next section. As there exists a relationship 
between the latent variables, we write the structural form of the equation that captures the 
focal firm’s knowledge building strategy and its M&A process. 
 !"#!,! = !! + !!!"#!,! + !!!""!,! + !!"#                      (4) 
 
Assuming that the creation of breadth and depth is correlated with the M&A decision, the 
following condition holds:  !"# !!"# , !!"# ≠ 0                                                                  (5) 
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The validity of equation (4) depends on the rejection of the exogeneity of the knowledge 
creation variables with respect to equation (1), which describes the firm’s involvement in 
acquiring external knowledge through M&As.  	
3.1.3 Breadth and Depth Indicators 
Empirical contributions agree on the definitions of the breadth and depth of technology 
(e.g. Bena & Li 2013; Chircu & Mahajan 2009; Gambardella & Torrisi 1998; Jose et al. 
1986; Laursen & Salter 2006; Miller 2006; Moorthy & Polley 2010; Wang & Von 
Tunzelmann 2000). The technological breadth of knowledge is related to the concept of 
diversification in a technological space (i.e., variety in the product space), while the 
technological depth of knowledge is linked to the sophistication of the technology itself 
(i.e., quality in the product space). Conversely, there are few attempts to measure such 
breadth and depth concepts, and the literature still lacks in providing common indices.  
The breadth index has been calculated by considering an inverse measure of the 
concentration indicator. For instance, Gambardella and Torrisi (1998) measure the 
technological diversification by means of the Herfindhal-Hirschman index (H) over 
patents for five sectors, namely, computers, telecommunications equipment, electronic 
components, other electronic products and other non-electronic products. A recent study 
by Gruber et al. (2013) also uses the Herfindahl concentration index to capture knowledge 
variety. In their influential study, Jose et al. (1986) measure the value of diversification as !"# = 1− ! = 1− !"#!!, where SLBj is the share of a firm's total sales originating in 
the j line of business, where ! = 1,…!. Furthermore, considering the well-known 
properties of the H index4, the author shows that DIV consists of two components, one 
																																																								
4	A nice property of the H index is that it measures concentration distinguished by two components, the 
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based on the number of product lines and the other based on the size of distribution or 
dispersion of sales shares across product lines.  
Thus, the index is !"# =  1− !! − !"#!! − !! !  .  
Focusing on the diversification in the technology space, Moorthy and Polley (2010) 
explicitly measure technological breadth and depth using an H-type index over the number 
of patents. Suppose a firm’s total number of patents is distributed over N patent classes. 
Let p be the fraction of patents that are in patent class i. The measure of technological 
knowledge diversity is !" = 1− !!!!!!! . A shortcoming of this index is that it does not 
provide any indication of the spread of patents across patent classes. However, upon 
rearranging, we have !" = 1− !! 1− !! − !!! − !! ! = !"! − !"!. Notice that 
TK is identical to the index DIV, but it is in the technological space over patents rather 
than lines of business. Furthermore, it is crucial that Moorthy and Polley (2010) 
distinguish two components of the technological diversification index, !"!, which 
accounts for the technological breadth dimension, and !"!, which accounts for the 
technological depth dimension. Thus, a single index encompasses both relevant 
dimensions of the technology. 
Conversely, because we are interested in the distinction between the breadth and depth of 
the innovation, we keep the two indices separated. However, similar to Moorthy and 
Polley (2010), we measure technological differentiation by means of patent dispersion 
using the H index. While our measure of breadth is based on Katila and Ahuja (2002), it 																																																																																																																																																																							
number of firms in a given sector and the size distribution of the firms themselves. Analytically, ! =!!! = !! − !!!, where !! = !! !!!!!!  is the market share of firm i and !! = !! !! − !! !represents the 
variance. Notice that in a market with equal size firms !! = !! = ⋯ = !!, H assumes the value of !!. 
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differs in that we use IPC codes and technology class. Accordingly, our measure of 
breadth is as follows:  
!"#$%&'!,! = 1!"#$ℎ ! !"#$%&!"# !,!!"#$%!"# !,!  
where UnusedIPC is the number of new IPC codes that appear (and cannot be found in 
patents from the last 5 year) in the patents of the biotech firm ‘k’ in year ‘t’. We divide 
this number by the total number of IPC codes of firm ‘k’ in year ‘t’. nTech is the number 
of technology classes in all the patents during the last 5 years5. Thus, we have a straight 
measure of diversification, which is the ratio between the new IPC and the old IPCs at the 
firm level, without calculating the concentration index and the diversification index. Note 
that we can have the !"#$%&'!,! value for every year t and a single index of 
technological diversification as a summary of the behavior of the firm (not an index for 
every technological class). The index always varies between 0 and 1, i.e., 0 ≤ !"#$%&ℎ!,! ≤ 1. 
 
With respect to the DEPTH index, we stress the difference from Moorthy and 
Polley’s (2010) !"! index. They measure the depth of technology as the distance between 
the concentration of the R&D effort measured by the squared number of patents (as a H-
type index) and the medium value (as if all patent classes were the same size). Conversely, 
we provide a more precise index that accounts for the IPC code repetitions weighted by 
the relative role of each IPC code. Thus, our depth index is as follows:  
!"#$%!,! = 1!"#$ℎ ! !"#"$%"&!"# !,!!!!!!(!!!)!"#$%!"# !,!  																																																								
5	Calculated following the technology-IPC concordance of Observatoire des Sciences et des Techniques 
(OST), Paris, France.	
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where RepeatedIPC represents the number of repetitions of the IPC codes in the last 5 
years. Depth can vary from 0 to any number. Similar to the breadth index, the depth index 
is also based on Katila and Ahuja (2002), but we used IPC codes instead of backward 
citations to account for patents of radical innovation that may not have any backward 
citations. 
 
3.2. Data 
 
Our initial data consist of 385 publicly traded biotechnology firms headquartered in the 
US and obtained from the patent board6 by looking at the patent descriptions of these 
firms. In particular, these firms are involved in human therapeutics (in-vivo or in-vitro) 
discoveries between 1985 and 2009. With some exceptions to the year of the firm’s 
foundation, almost all of the firms were founded during this period. Thus, all the patents7 
of these firms are applied to USPTO or EPO8. These patents are the first applications in 
either of the patent offices. We consider the date of patent filing with the patent office to 
capture the immediate effect of the invention. From PATSTAT9 (April 2010), we extract 
the primary as well as the secondary IPC codes for each patent. We discard those patents 
that do not have any IPC codes, and we calculate the depth and breadth based on the 
formula presented in the previous section for the years between 1990-2009. 
																																																								
6 US-based leading independent provider of the best research tools and matrices for patent analysis and 
intellectual property investment 
7 We have checked from the patent board that there were no patent applications filed in 2010 by these firms. 
8 United States Patent and Trademark Office  (USPTO); European Patent Office (EPO) 
9 EPO worldwide patent statistical database created by the European Patent Office covers the patent offices 
of more than 80 countries. 
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We obtain alliance data for these firms from Recombinant Capital10. These data are 
based on two criteria. First, the alliance involves cross licensing, and second, it involves 
R&D and co-development agreements. Because of these restrictions, the number of firms 
with alliance information drops to 202. For these 202 firms, we retrieve all the 
announcements of completed acquisitions from Thomson Reuter’s Security Data 
Corporation (SDC). The acquisitions meet the established criteria in that (i) they were 
announced between 1990 and 2009 and completed no later than the end of 2009, (ii) the 
deal value as equal to or greater than US$ 1 million, and (iii) the acquirer purchased more 
than 50% of the target. The SDC database also provides us with the four digit North 
American Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes of the acquirers and the targets. 
Finally, we extract the financial data of these 202 firms from Compustat North America 
(Standard & Poor’s Research Insight). Finally, we aggregate all the data to the firm-year 
level and obtain an unbalanced panel of 202 firms with 14909 patents from 1990 to 2009, 
resulting in 4040 firm-year observations for the analysis. 
 
3.3. Variables  
 
3.3.1. Constructs and indicators or variables 
The first part of the indicator is related to technology-based M&As. These variables 
consist of several parts and determine the latent construct involvement in corporate 
takeover (INV). The focal firm can acquire a firm (target) or can be acquired by some 
other firm. In the high-tech industry, such as biotechnology, the objective of the acquirer 
is, through the R&D efforts of the targets, to fulfill the acquirer’s future plan of 
discoveries and breakthrough inventions. Accordingly, we have taken those cases where 																																																								
10 A California-based biotechnology consulting company that incorporates detailed description of alliances 
of the global biotech and pharmaceuticals industries since 1973. The database is based on SEC (10-K, 10-Q, 
S-1 and 8-K) and FDA filings, press releases, and industry conferences. 
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the focal firms are the acquirer. To capture the effect of the acquisition, we use a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if the focal firm make an acquisition announcement in the year 
before it applies for a patent and is 0 otherwise. Furthermore, to distinguish the effect of 
knowledge diffusion through the M&A, we create two variables – technology-related, 
which includes the number of target firms with similar technology, and technology-
unrelated, which includes the number of target firms with dissimilar technology. 
Following Higgins and Rodriguez (2006), we consider technology unrelated targets as 
those firms engaged in over-the-counter or generic drugs, consumer products, medical 
devices and products and manufacturing facilities. Conversely, the technology related 
targets are those cases where the target firms belong to the industry, 2833 to 2836 (SIC), 
and are engaged in only biopharmaceutical activities. We assume a one -year lag for both 
of these variables. As other firms can acquire a percentage of ownership of the focal firms, 
we control for the number of times it is taken over in the one year before it applied for a 
patent. 
The indicators used for the latent variable innovation (INN) are discussed herein. We 
use firm-specific control variables that might impact the knowledge stock of the firm. 
Scherer (1965) finds that patenting is an increasing function of firm size. Larger firms 
often have multiple projects running simultaneously and can thus potentially better exploit 
external knowledge11 (Schmidt 2010). Therefore, we control for firm size using the 
logarithm of total assets. As Hall et al. (2005) argue that the heterogeneity across the 
biotech firms is due to differences in R&D spending, we include R&D intensity. Because 
the financial condition of the firms affects their innovation activities, we control for 
																																																								
11 Smaller firms can take more risks than larger firms. Additionally, they are flexible to changes in the 
technological environment. 
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leverage, measured by the ratio of debt to equity. As the economic conditions that affect 
the innovation activities may change over time, we also include year dummies. The firm 
age is included to control for the effect of experience in innovation of the firms. 
Furthermore, as the firms also engage in alliances for scientific research and innovation 
purposes we control the number of alliances with a two-year lag. 
For the latent construct quality of knowledge (KNW), we use patent data12 to identify 
the types of technology used for a particular invention. A patent is one of the most 
prominent vehicles to diffuse and appropriate knowledge. We include breadth and depth 
variables at this point. Katila and Ahuja’s (2002) study is exceptionally noteworthy in 
measuring the depth and breadth variables using the backward patent citations data. 
However, when the firm develops a breakthrough invention, by nature of the invention 
and the patent, it may not have any citations to prior works (backward citations). 
Therefore, rather than considering backward citations13 of patents, as Katila and Ahuja 
(2002) do, we use IPC codes that directly measure the combinations of technology used in 
the inventions. Additionally, unlike Lerner (1994), who used 4-digit IPC codes for the 
study of patent scope in the biotechnology industry, we use 8-digit IPC codes, as two IPC 
codes can differ at many levels14. 
 
3.3.2. Descriptive statistics 
Tables 1(a-b) and 2 show the descriptive statistics of the data and the pairwise correlation 
among the variables, respectively. In Table 1a, we see that the depth varies between 0 and 
23.5, while the breadth ranges from 0 to 1. Both variables are continuous. We also find the 																																																								
12 For the importance and applicability of patent data for inventions, see Griliche’s (1990) survey 
13 In the case of breakthrough inventions that do not depend on prior works, it may be impossible to capture 
the depth and breadth of knowledge by backward citations.	
14 A short discussion is given in Appendix 2. 
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presence of influential outliers of depth and breadth variables. Accordingly, these two 
variables are winsorised at 1% (0.5 percent on both sides). As breadth is a ratio of new 
IPC codes (not used in the last 5 years) in the focal patents of firm k in year t, the value of 
the index cannot exceed 1, where 1 indicates that all IPC codes of that particular year are 
new. Examining the average age of these firms, we find that these firms are not new firms 
as their average age is 22 years. With respect to Table 1b, we note that the maximum 
number of alliances is 23, while the maximum number of M&As is one-third the number 
of alliances.  
Table 2 shows a matrix of correlation residuals, that is, the difference between the 
adjusted (observed) correlation matrix and the reproduced (fitted) correlation matrix. It 
determines whether any factor has an extremely weak predictive capacity. For instance, if 
a residual is much larger than zero (in absolute value), the model will have difficulty 
reproducing the original correlations with that factor. However, in our case, the table 
appears fairly strong.  
[Table 1a and 1b about here] 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
3.4. Measurement model and results 
Following Anderson and Gerbing (1988), we begin by testing whether our structural 
model has an acceptable goodness-of-fit. As the Cronbach’s alpha underestimates the 
reliability in the presence of multidimensional measures, it is convenient to check the 
unidimensionality of the construct (Bollen 1989). Thus, to find a descriptive assessment of 
unidimensionality, we apply exploratory factor analysis to the variables used in this 
analysis. The three well-defined latent variables (INV, INN and KNW) reveal that the 
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eigenvalues greater than one accounted for 70% of the variance of the indicators 
(variables). The factor pattern coefficients are 0.75, 0.87, and 0.82, respectively, (not 
reported) and indicate that each factor influences as few variables as possible. The small 
magnitude of the fitting of the cross-factor loading also indicates that we cannot reject 
unidimensionality. Thus, we start by fitting a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model. 
Our model includes ten items that describe the three latent variables. The items include 
merger dummy, number of related (or unrelated) acquisitions, number of times the focal 
firm is taken over (targeted), R&D intensity, alliance, firm size, firm age, leverage, depth 
and breadth. The CFA model allows each item to have its own unique variance, thus 
enabling us to obtain a better measure of the latent variables. We use maximum likelihood 
estimation. The results from the CFA is also show evidence of unidimensionality. 
 
3.4.1a Model fit 
The goodness-of-fit index with the acceptable threshold values is presented in Table 3a. 
Although the chi-square is statistically significant at the traditional level, which is 
acceptable given that we have 202 biotech firms with over 4000 observations - a relatively 
large sample (Bagozzi & Yi 1988). All the item loadings for each construct in the paths of 
the measurement model are significant (p<0.01). Comparing previous studies (Hu & 
Bentler 1998; Hu & Bentler 1999; Sharma et al. 2005), we see that the overall fit of the 
measurement model is acceptable. The measures indicate that the optimized model is 
effectively supported by the data.   
[Table 3a about here] 
 
 
	 24	
3.5 Estimations from structural equation model 
This section presents details of the econometric analysis undertaken using structural 
equation modeling (SEM) and the results. SEM is the preferred method of analysis in this 
study as it allows the study of multiple relationships simultaneously, provides a measure 
of overall model fit, and explains the significance of each of the relationships among the 
variables (Kline & Rosenberg 1986). Unlike multiple regression and path analyses, SEM 
accounts for the effects of measurement error in multi-item variables. Moreover, the 
output indicates whether the model is supported by the data as a whole and includes a 
significance test for the various individual relationships. Furthermore, the approach is 
effective when testing models that are path analytic with mediating variables and that 
contain latent constructs that are being measured with multiple indicators.  
 
 [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The standardized direct effect in Table 3b shows the potential relationship for the 
structural model and path significance of related and unrelated acquisitions. The first and 
second columns present the related-technology and associated critical ratio. The third and 
fourth columns present the unrelated-technology and associated critical ratio. Regarding 
the relationship between involvement and innovation, in the technology-related M&A, the 
impact is -0.73, and in the technology-unrelated M&A, the impact is -0.62. This implies 
that an increase in the takeover decision is expected to decrease by 0.73 (for related M&A) 
and 0.62 (for unrelated M&A) in innovation activities. This is consistent with a number of 
studies that indicate a negative effect in the post-merger period. Interestingly, knowledge 
development is also positively affected by this M&A decision through the innovation 
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process, thus implying that acquiring another firm contributes to the depth and breadth of 
technology of the focal firm.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
[Table 3b about here] 
 
We report the estimates from the measurement model as well as the standardized 
loadings and the t-statistics (critical ratio) to assess the significance of these loadings in 
Table 3c. The standardized direct effect of knowledge development on the knowledge 
dimension indicates that an increase in knowledge quality, developed through the 
technology collaboration and M&As, leads to a 0.73 (related M&A) and a 0.34 (unrelated 
M&A) increase in technological depth and a 0.42 (related M&A) and a 0.82 (unrelated 
M&A) increase in technological breadth. These results clearly indicate that M&As tend to 
increase both the depth and the breadth of technological knowledge. However, related 
acquisition increases the depth of knowledge more strongly than the breadth of 
knowledge, while the opposite results are found for unrelated acquisition. These results 
are consistent with our expectations. 
We also estimate separate models for the confirmatory analysis, with and without 
constraining the parameters across the two groups – related technology and unrelated 
technology (not reported). The standardized direct effect of knowledge development on 
the dimension of knowledge indicates that an increase in knowledge quality, developed 
through technology collaboration and M&As, leads to a 0.61 (related M&A) and a 0.24 
(unrelated M&A) increase in technological depth as well as a 0.50 (related M&A) and a 
0.74 (unrelated M&A) increase in technological breadth. 
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As we control for the knowledge diffusion prior to the M&A through alliances that 
may affect the impact the knowledge development process as well as the existing 
knowledge on the innovation process, we further modify our model by including an extra 
path - from the INV to KNW and from KNW to INN. Moreover, we also drop the 
variables with very low loading values, such as the patent stock. With these modifications, 
all factor loadings in our optimized model show a good fit to the data, and all three 
structural equation models converge without problems. The average variance extracted for 
each construct is greater than 0.63, and the CFI of the measurement model increased to 
0.963. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
[Table 3c about here] 
In our model, the innovation that affects the knowledge stock of the firms has no 
specific cause. In the presence of a single specified cause of the dependent construct, the 
squared multiple correlations (SMC) move toward the coefficient of the direct effect. 
Bentler (1995) argues that with multiple causes of the dependent variables, an SMC 
should be estimated as one minus the standardized error variance of the construct. The 
SMC for the INN is (1-0.86)=0.14, which suggests that 14% of the variation in innovation 
can be attributed to involvement. The SMC for KNW is (1-0.59)=0.41. This means that 
41% of the variations can be attributed to involvement in the involvement – knowledge 
relationships. Thus, a structural relationship for INV and INN is weaker than that for INV 
and KNW.  
In sum, although we did not find a strong direct impact of firms’ involvement in 
M&As on the depth and breadth of knowledge, our data reveal the positive indirect 
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influence of knowledge development through innovation on two knowledge dimensions - 
technological breadth and depth. 
 
3.6 Additional test to address endogeneity 
In this section, we apply different model specifications to determine the robustness of our 
results. First, we note that variance inflation factors (VIFs) of all variables are below 5, 
confirming that there are no multi-collinearity problems among the variables. 
As we do not have detailed information with respect to the properties of error terms, 
maximum likelihood estimators may be imperfect. To eliminate the effect of firm specific 
fixed effects, a first differenced equation by two-stage least square (2SLS) can be used 
(Anderson & Hsiao 1981). However, the 2SLS estimator is asymptotically inefficient and 
does not account for all available orthogonal restrictions (Bertrand & Zuniga 2006).  
As a solution to this situation, Arellano and Bond (Arellano & Bond 1991) proposed a 
first differenced generalized method of moments (GMM) for a dynamic panel model. The 
approach generates the orthogonal restrictions by introducing all possible lags of 
explanatory variables as instruments. However, Bond (2002) shows that this first 
differencing may perform poorly if the series is close to being random walks. Later, 
Arellano and Bover (Arellano & Bover 1995) suggest that the moment conditions can 
increase the efficiency of the estimator by adding the original equations, by levels, to the 
system. Thus, we use the following model: !"#!" = !! + !!!"#!, !!! +  !!!"!!,!!" + !!!"!!,!!" + !! + !! + !!,!                            (6) ! = 1, 2,…! !"#$% !"#  ! = 1, 2,…! !"#$% 
where !"#!,! is the depth or breadth for firm k in year t, !!,!!"  are exogenous firm 
level controls, and ! = ! !" (! − 1) and !!,!!" are endogenous firm level time-variant main 
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explanatory variables of interest. Because the production of knowledge is a continuous 
process, the outsourcing of knowledge by strategic alliances and technology-based M&As 
depends on the previous year’s knowledge base, !"#!,(!!!). This lagged dependent 
variable captures the dynamic adjustment of knowledge production. !! is the measure of 
time-invariant variables affecting the depth and breadth used in the innovation activities. !! is the time-varying shocks. !!, !!!"and !!!" are the parameters to be estimated, where !!!" determines the effect of alliances and M&As, and !!!" determines the impact of firm 
level controls.  
The procedure is called a system GMM in which the additional moment conditions of 
the system GMM estimator corresponds to the model at the level with a lagged difference 
of endogenous variables as instruments15. 
The additional moment conditions are:  
 ![(!"#!, !!! !! + !!,! ] = 0 !"# ! = 3, 4,… ,! 
 ![!!, !!! !! + !!,! ] = 0 !"# ! = 3, 4,… ,! 
 
With respect to the differenced equations, lagged and future differences of the R&D 
expenses, propensity to patent, sales growth and the last three years’ number of alliances 
are used as instruments. Firms generally invest more effort in current technological 
activities if the demand for their products, based on the current technologies, is increasing 
(Wu & Shanley 2009). For this reason, we use the knowledge stock of the focal firm as 
one of the instruments in the model, and we operationalize the variable by considering the 
patent applied from the last 5 years. These instruments are valid because they are 
correlated with the firms’ R&D activities but not with the time-invariant effect or current 																																																								
15 Because in equation (2) the variable Size is endogenous, we also control for this in the system GMM. 
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error terms. Blundell and Bond (Blundell & Bond 1998) suggest that the estimator can 
also solve weak instrument problems. To analyze the effect of M&As on knowledge 
production using equation (8), we apply a two-step system GMM.  
Because the data reveal a large number of patents for the years 1995 and from 2000 to 
2002, a regression is run on a reduced sample that eliminating the data for these 4 years. 
Additionally, we control for sub-industry because within the biotech industry there are 
many sub-industries, such as biological products, in vitro and in vivo diagnostics, 
medicinal chemicals, etc. The biotechnology industry is highly concentrated in some US 
states, such as California, New Jersey, Massachusetts, among others. Therefore, we 
control for these states. Following the definition of exploration alliances, as given by the 
literature (Koza & Lewin 1998; Lane & Lubatkin 1998; Rothaermel 2001; Rothaermel & 
Deeds 2004), we include the effect of exploration alliance as an interaction term with the 
number of acquisition variables. A firm’s learning process and its nearness to tacit 
knowledge motivates the exploration alliance (Lane & Lubatkin 1998), which, in turn, 
improves the absorption capacity of the firm. We estimate the model using the sample 
from the two-step system GMM. Table 4 reports the results for the effect of acquisitions 
and the interplay between alliances and M&As. We find the results are robust, and there is 
no significant shift in the direction of the effect. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here]
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we attempt to investigate the impact of technology-based M&As and 
prior alliances on the depth and breadth of knowledge by considering the dynamics of 
knowledge production. We use a sample of US biotechnology firms that were engaged in 
human therapeutics between 1989 and 2009. Overall, the results suggest that prior 
alliance with universities or research organizations and acquiring unrelated technological 
firms increases the breadth and diversity of the firm’s technological knowledge. 
Furthermore, prior alliances with competitors in the same industry (other biotech firms) 
and related technology-based acquisitions increase the depth of knowledge. This has 
important implications as it shows that firms must be very selective in choosing their 
partners and targets, as their knowledge stock has significant impact on the breadth 
and/or depth of the R&D activities of the firm. As the mutual collaboration agreements 
are incomplete contracts, an optimal level of integration is needed for the firms to be 
productive. Moreover, the prior literature shows that there exists an inverted U-shape 
relation between the number of partners and the knowledge creation process. In other 
words, the speed of knowledge expansion may decrease gradually as the firm reaches its 
maximum amount of manageable technology. Thus, in addition to a positive relation 
between alliances and depth of knowledge, firms also increase their breadth of 
knowledge.  
Most often, firms have shorter time-horizons for alliance partnership than they do for 
R&D in a high-technology industry. Thus, it is challenging to leverage the internal depth 
and breadth of knowledge by external sources through alliances. Our findings indicate 
that the biotechnology firms can increase their depth of knowledge by outsourcing 
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knowledge from partners in a similar industry, that is, by allying with competitors or by 
engaging in M&As with biotechnology or pharmaceutical firms. However, engaging in 
strategic alliances with rival firms may lead to the leaking of critical information or 
technological knowledge, which may jeopardize the existing competitive advantage of 
the biotech firms. Thus, managers may need to allocate more resources to internal R&D 
to build up technological breadth before they seek particular complementary knowledge 
from rivals to increase the depth of the firms. Accordingly, they may be able to prevent 
unwanted spillovers of knowledge to potential competitors. 
Because of the diversity among the firms in the technological knowledge that 
separates the types of M&As based on industry, we find that related M&As (among 
similar industries) and unrelated M&As (among dissimilar industries) positively impact 
the creation of depth and breadth of knowledge, respectively. This result serves as a 
useful perspective in the M&A literature that focuses on the technological knowledge 
development related to M&As (e.g. Cloodt et al. 2006; Danzon et al. 2007; Desyllas & 
Hughes 2010; Hagedoorn & Duysters 2002; Makri et al. 2010). 
Although, the existing studies have ignored the relationship between the firm’s 
involvement in M&As and the development of breadth and depth of technology through 
innovation, our study suggests that there exists a critical link between the M&A and the 
internal knowledge development process. 
The findings also have important economic and policy implications. First, these 
results indicate that the firm should not only consider the potential benefits of such 
corporate takeovers for present innovation and financial objectives but that the firm 
should take into account the additional costs of strengthening its knowledge development 
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process for future cost-effective innovation programs. Second, our study reveals another 
significant approach towards choosing the target for acquisition whether technologically 
related or unrelated, as this has a major impact on the breadth and depth of the knowledge 
stock of the firm. Thus, the focus for the short-term benefit from an M&A may yield 
negative outcomes (Cloodt et al. 2006), while in the long-term, if the firm’s objective is 
to develop breadth and depth ex ante the innovation process, such a collaborative 
approach will result in the firm’s success. 
This paper has certain limitations. First, we used the reported R&D expenses to 
control for the knowledge development process. Compustat reports only internally 
sponsored R&D. Although these data can reveal the effect of internal finance constraints 
of small firms, for larger firms with better access to external R&D investments, the data 
fail to capture the effect of other research grants and external research support that 
biotech firms may have obtained to complement their internal R&D. Second, patent data 
are considered to be  noisy as they cannot take into account all the inventions that a firm 
is currently working on and that contribute to the knowledge development process. 
However, as a number of studies have used patent data as codified indicators of 
inventions, the results of the present study, which are based on all documented innovation 
activities, are comparable with a substantial body of prior research16. Third, because the 
inventors’ and firms’ names were not matched in the PATSTAT database, the data do not 
provide patent information of the client firms involved in strategic alliances. It would be 
interesting to investigate whether both partners are jointly working on the invention 
process and whether this could allow for a more direct measure of knowledge spillovers. 																																																								
16 See a number of studies (Cassiman et al. 2005; Grimpe & Hussinger 2008; Jaffe et al. 1993; Valentini 
2012) 
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Fourth, as the present study is limited to one industry, future studies may investigate 
other industries or analyze cross-industry samples to determine if and how much the 
results herein are specific to the biotech industry. Despite these limitations, we believe 
that the study has provided valuable insights to the success of M&A portfolios.  
To conclude, the empirical results of this paper substantially support the theoretically 
developed expectations and highlight the R&D collaboration strategies of high-tech firms 
that combine technological knowledge from different types of partners and collaborations 
(alliances and M&As), while also integrating knowledge for developing depth and 
breadth. Accordingly, this study helps to clarify the complex strategic selection process 
of partner and target firms for the joint production of technological knowledge, and it 
sheds some light on the complicated symbiotic relationship between alliances and M&As 
in innovation activities. We hope that our findings may assist policy makers in optimizing 
M&A decisions and that our suggestions for future research may stimulate future 
academic research. 
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A
ppendix 1: V
ariable definitions 
 
V
ariables 
D
ata Source 
1.  
 
 
D
epth: D
uring the last five years, the average num
ber of tim
es the firm
 repeatedly used the IPC
 
codes in the patents 
 
PA
TSTA
T 
 
2.   
B
readth: Proportion of the new
 IPC
 codes in the focal year's patent, not used in the previous five 
years' list of patents 
 
PA
TSTA
T 
 
3. 
A
lliance: N
um
ber of alliances (t-2) 
R
ecom
binant C
apital 
 4. 
 M
erger: A
cquisition dum
m
y variables 
Thom
son SD
C 
 5.   
R
elated: N
um
ber of acquisitions of firm
s in related industries (t-2)  
Thom
son SD
C 
6. 
U
nrelated: N
um
ber of acquisitions of firm
s in unrelated industries (t-2) 
Thom
son SD
C 
  7.  
  Firm
 age: Firm
 age (2009-year of inception) 
 
 C
om
pany W
ebsite,G
EN
 G
uides to 
B
iotech C
om
panies-1996 
 8.   
Firm
 size: N
atural logarithm
 of total assets 
C
om
pustat 
9. 
R
&
D
 intensity: R
&
D
 expenses (t-2) /total sales (t-1)  
C
om
pustat 
 10.   
Targeted: N
um
ber of tim
es taken over (t-1) 
C
om
pustat 
11. 
K
now
ledge stock:  Patent num
bers in last 5 years calculated assum
ing 15%
 annual depreciation 
and an 8%
 grow
th backw
ard in tim
es 
PA
TSTA
T 
 
12. 
Financial Leverage (debt/equity) (t-2)  
C
om
pustat 
N
otes: V
ariables 1 and 2 are for the latent construct ‘K
N
W
’; V
ariables 3, 4, 5, 6, &
 10 are for latent construct ‘IN
V
’; and V
ariables 7, 8, 9, &
 12 are for the latent 
construct ‘IN
N
’. V
ariable 11 is used in system
-G
M
M
 along w
ith other variables.
Appendix II 
Structure of International Patent Classification (IPC) codes and differences among them 
at various levels 
 
Let us consider some patents and few of their IPC codes of Amgen Inc.  
 
Appendix-IIa 
Firm Patent Filed Year IPCs 
Amgen 
 
 
 
US7687533 2007 A61P19/02 
 
US7667008 2007 A01K67/027 
 
US7705132 2007 A61K39/395 
US7572934 
 
2008 
 
 
A61K31/155 
A61K31/192 
C07C59/68 
 
 
 
Appendix-IIb 
Level Comparison 
Section A61K31/155 and C07C59/68 
 
Class A61K31/155 and A01K67/027 
 
Subclass A61K31/155 and A61P19/02  
 
Group 
 
A61K31/155 and A61K39/395 
Subgroup A61K31/155 and A61K31/192 
    
 
Notes: Each of the levels defines the technology in hierarchical way. The above tables show how 
technology varies at different levels. 			
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Table 1a 
Descriptive Statistics for the firms engaged in R&D related alliances and 
acquisitions during 1989-2009 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Depth 1830 0.912 1.834 0 23.5 
Breadth 1885 0.204 0.337 0 1 
Merger (dummy) 1885 0.217 0.412 0 1 
Related 1885 0.135 0.472 0 8 
Unrelated 1885 0.050 0.268 0 4 
Targeted 1884 0.166 0.468 0 4 
Alliance 1883 1.850 2.835 0 23 
R&D Intensity 1254 35.348 288.207 0 7326.190 
Leverage 1466 0.316 7.393 -117.328 186.768 
Firm age 1885 21.995 4.704 8 48 
Firm size 1472 4.227 1.722 -3.381 10.453 
Notes: The depth and breadth have been calculated from 14909 patents filed during 1985-2009 in the 
USPTO and EPO by 202 firms engaged in human therapeutics (in-vitro and in-vivo). 
We considered only that M&As, where the firms are acquirers. The ‘related’ firms refer to those that 
belong to SIC codes 2833-2836, i.e. those are engaged only in biopharmaceutical activities. The ‘unrelated’ 
acquisitions include over-the-counter or generic drugs, medical and consumer devices, manufacturing 
facilities and organic and inorganic chemical research firms.  
 
 
 
Table 1b 
Number of strategic alliances and M&As during year 1989-2009 
  Min Max        Min Max 
Strategic alliances 1 23      Technology-based acquisitions 1 8 
Number of alliances with universities 0 9      Number of related acquisition 0 8 
Number of alliances with competitors 0 19      Number of unrelated acquisition 0 4 
Notes: The minimum and maximum values are yearly basis. Alliances means when the sample firms plays  
either R&D firms or clients or both. Acquisitions refer to the cases when the sample firms acquire other 
firms. M&As data is taken from Thomson’s SDC and strategic alliances data is from Recombinant Capital. 															
T
able 2: Standardized residual correlation 
V
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0.057 
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-0.075 
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0.001 
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0.424 
0.643 
4.R
elated 
0.001 
0.019 
0.091 
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0.402 
0.668 
5.U
nrelated 
-0.019 
-0.007 
0.081 
-0.063 
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0.152 
0.584 
6.Targeted 
0.031 
0.012 
0.021 
-0.016 
-0.012 
0 
 
 
 
 
0.056 
0.752 
7.A
lliance 
-0.021 
0.014 
0.002 
-0.015 
-0.010 
0.022 
0 
 
 
 
0.288 
0.707 
8.R
&
D
 Intensity 
-0.006 
-0.002 
-0.004 
0.003 
0.000 
0.001 
-0.014 
0 
 
 
0.008 
0.810 
9.Leverage 
0.014 
0.013 
-0.011 
0.006 
0.010 
0.001 
0.008 
0.006 
0 
 
0.003 
0.538 
10.Firm
 age 
-0.014 
0.005 
-0.008 
0.004 
0.007 
0.048 
-0.005 
0.004 
-0.005 
0 
0.078 
0.822 
11.Firm
 size 
-0.022 
-0.066 
-0.018 
0.038 
0.016 
-0.016 
0.087 
0.008 
0.001 
0.014 
0.398 
0.676 
N
otes: The table show
s the raw
 and standardized residuals of the observed correlation w
ith respect to the fitted correlation m
atrix.  SM
C
 is the squared m
ultiple 
correlations betw
een each variable and all other variables. K
M
O
 reports the K
aiser-M
eyer-O
lkin m
easure of sam
pling adequacy. It varies betw
een 0 and 1. 
H
igher the K
M
O
 value of variables, better the variables to be used in factor analysis. 
	
T
able 3a: G
oodness of fit 
  
A
cquisition 
A
cceptable  
threshold level 
  
R
elated 
U
nrelated 
C
om
parative Fit Index (C
FI) 
0.975 
0.959 
>0.95 
Tucker-Lew
is Index (TLI) 
0.948 
0.957 
>0.95
a 
Standardized Root M
ean Squared (SRM
R) 
0.037 
0.033 
<0.08
b 
Root M
ean Squared Error of Approxim
ation (RM
SEA) 
0.047 
0.037 
<0.05
b 
! ! 
114.034 
93.06 
Insignificant p-value 
D
egree of freedom
 
33 
26 
  
N
otes: This indicates overall fit of the m
odel. ! !: p<0.05 (significant at 5%
 level). ( ! !!" ) should be betw
een tw
o and five  (Joreskog &
 Sorbom
 1993). a Sharm
a et 
al. (2005) b H
u and B
entler (H
u &
 B
entler 1998; H
u &
 B
entler 1999) 
	
Table 3b: Structural Model- Factor loadings 
 Relationships 
Standardized Coefficient 
(Related) CRa      
Standardized Coefficient 
(Unrelated) CRa 
Involvement -> Innovation -0.732 -16.16 
 
-0.629 -9.39 
 
(0.045) 
  
(0.067) 
 Innovation -> Knowledge 0.288 7.86 
 
0.310 6.91 
 
(0.037) 
  
(0.045) 
 Notes: CRa is the critical ratio (equivalent to z-statistics) to test that statistical significance. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. All coefficients are statistically significant at 0.1% level.		
 
Table 3c: Measurement Model- Factor loadings 
Latent Variables 
Involvement  
(INV) CRa 
Innovation  
(INN) CRa 
Knowledge  
(KNW) CRa 
Panel A             
Merger (dummy) 0.451 13.14 
    Related Acquisition (2-yr lag) 0.626 17.01 
    Targeted (2-yr lag) 0.326 8.78 
    R&D intensity  (2-yr lag) 
  
0.085b 1.93 
  Alliance (2-yr lag) 
  
-0.731 -24.69 
  Firm size 
  
-0.804 -30.67 
  Firm age 
  
-0.227 -6.84 
  Leverage  (2-yr lag) 
  
-0.422b -0.66 
  Depth  
    
0.733 12.49 
Breadth 
    
0.426b 1.41 
Construct reliability 0.461 
 
0.552 
 
0.512 
 Variance extracted 23.38% 
 
28.35% 
 
35.93% 
 Panel B          
Merger (dummy) 0.603 10.36 
    Unrelated Acquisition (2-yr lag) 0.521 5.49 
    Targeted  (2-yr lag) 0.251 6.32 
    R&D intensity (2-yr lag) 
  
0.081 8.52 
  Alliance (2-yr lag) 
  
-0.560 -20.85 
  Firm size 
  
-0.841 -25.95 
  Firm age 
  
-0.203 -6.09 
  Leverage  (2-yr lag) 
  
-0.619b -0.58 
  Depth  
    
0.341 11.94 
Breadth 
    
0.822 9.12 
Construct reliability 0.451 
 
0.564 
 
0.543 
 Variance extracted 23.27%  29.04%  41.18%  
Notes: Maximum likelihood estimation. To avoid endogeneity problem we have taken 2-year lag for the 
independent variables. Factor loadings with critical ratio (CRa) are shown. Panel A is for related and Panel 
B is for unrelated acquisitions. All coefficients are statistically significant at 0.1% level. Factor loadings 
with superscript (b) are not statistically significant at any traditional levels.							
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Table 4: 
Sensitivity analysis: System-GMM dynamic panel-two-step robust estimates	
Dependent variables Depth Breadth Depth Breadth 
Merger (dummy) -2.251*** 0.056*** -2.162*** 0.022*** 
 
(-17.85) -4.62 (-23.69) (-3.99) 
Targeted (t-2) -0.581*** -0.039 -0.230*** -0.025*** 
 
(-7.20) (-0.54) (-5.28) (-9.66)    
Related acquisitions (t-2) 0.338*** 0.015* 
  
 
(-5.59) (-2.15) 
  Unrelated acquisitions (t-2) 
  
-0.763*** 0.064***
   
(-13.48) (-7.58)    
Firm age 0.239*** -0.002 0.298*** -0.004*  
 
(-9.94) (-1.07) (-22.11) (-2.40)    
Firm size 0.621*** -0.052*** 0.580*** -0.048*** 
 
(-13.56) (-12.37) (-17.08) (-10.56)    
R&D intensity (t-2) -0.024*** 0.029 -0.027*** -0.042**  
 
(-3.51) (-0.35) (-3.55) (-3.15)    
Leverage (t-2) 0.066*** -0.039 0.079*** -0.081**  
 
(-30.99) (-0.48) (-40.41) (-2.75)    
Alliance (t-2) 0.260*** -0.004 0.298*** 0.006*** 
 
(-10.59) (-1.85) (-19.25) (-3.72) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept -4.912*** 0.471*** -5.713*** 0.353*** 
 
(-7.15) (-8.67) (-11.75) (-7.82) 
Observation 1158 1158 1158 1158 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1)-p 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)-p 0.746 0.763 0.861 0.911 
Hansen J-stat.-p 0.716 0.587 0.810 0.636 
Diff-in-Hansen GMM instr.-p 0.984 0.320 0.615 0.986 
Notes: Instruments for the level equations are number of alliances in last 5 years and sales growth. A 
maximum of two lags are used.  
In all the models state of firms location and industry effects are included but not reported.  
Hansen test statistics of over identifying restrictions, tests for correlation among residuals and instruments, 
are reported (p-values only). The validity of the additional moment conditions for the level equations is 
shown by difference Hansen tests. The p-values for the first and second order serial correlations AR(1) and 
AR(2) are shown. t-statistics are in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 5%, ** denotes significance at 
the 1% and *** denotes significance at the 0.1%. 													
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Figure 1: Impact of related acquisitions on knowledge development 	
		
Figure 2: Impact of unrelated acquisitions on knowledge development 	
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Figure 1: Related M&As
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Figure 2: Unrelated M&As
